Finding Forward Solutions

One of the issues against Kilmarnock was the inability to convert good field positions into chances.

Celtic were relying on playing through their wide players, or linking with Kyogo Furuhashi dropping deep, or the number eights creating from the centre.

Compared to the first two games of the season, Kyogo did not get on the ball nearly as much (19 on ball events compared to an average of 30 in the first league fixtures).

And the number eights (Matt O’Riley and Odin Holm) were man marked quite effectively.

The two wingers (Liel Abada and Daizen Maeda) received six and 14 pack passes between them and had pack receive scores on the day of 55 (3^rd highest) and 85 (highest). This means that Celtic were getting the ball to the wide players through the Kilmarnock midfield. But between them they created one chance and did not have a single shot at goal.

Neither is particularly effective with back to goal and unlike Jota, are not adept at taking in a pass and immediately driving forwards. Maeda prefers to run in behind onto the ball, and Abada is most adept gaining possession in or near the box near colleagues to form quick passing combinations.

Both receiving the ball wide and relatively isolated meant they often lost the ball or played a safe pass back.

It was one of those days when no parts of the Celtic attack functioned smoothly, so it is not all down to the wide players.

But what would be a more optimal combination and alignment to better get attacking momentum?

Final Third Effectiveness

I developed this view as a sort of risk / reward indicator for wingers and number tens.

We have Final 3^rd Losses on one side meaning the number of times per 90m the player loses the ball in the opposition final third without there being a shot, pass, corner, throw in won – i.e. either keeping possession from the players actions or getting a shot away.

On the other axis is Passes Backward in Final 3^rd. This is the percentage of passes from the player within the final third that are backwards as opposed to sideways or forwards.

It is by season based on players with over 900 minutes who appeared mainly as wingers or number tens.

Top right is optimal as the passing is rarely back, and the efficiency in terms of final third losses is high.

Bottom right is probably ok to – this would be the risk takers so higher final third losses but rare backward passes.

Left and middle to bottom is probably suboptimal as it indicates low risk taking and high levels of playing safe and going backwards.

What Celtic miss losing Jota is that final third risk taking from a player who looked to go forward predominantly. Mo Elyounoussi profiled similarly.

And back to team dynamics – this balanced nicely with the different skill set of Maeda who is by far the most likely to pass backwards but had other skills such as running In behind that Jota rarely did.

Top right you see the traditional number tens Tom Rogic and David Turnbull who are advanced midfielders rather than wingers and had high final third retention whilst rarely going backwards.

Also, there’s a cluster of James Forrest’s seasons. I used to talk about Forrest as being a relatively conservative winger meaning he kept possession well whilst maybe not putting too much risk in the play and this view illustrates that well.

Back to the Kilmarnock game and what Celtic have now out wide is a very safe winger in Maeda who cameos back to a far greater degree that any other recent player in that position, but who doesn’t put a lot of risk into his play either.

Then Abada, who tries to play more similarly to Jota in that he tries to get at defences but lacks the high-end technical skills Jota has.

What to do?

To get more creativity higher up the pitch, it might work better to play Turnbull (or Haksabanovic!) as a natural ten and have two deeper midfielders in a more traditional 4-2-3-1 shape. This may allow for better link ups and closer relationships between the four outright attacking players meaning the wide players may have the option inside of the ten and Kyogo.

Celtic also need to think about how the full backs are being used to support the wingers to avoid situations where the only feasible pass is a backwards one. Under Postecoglou they were effective at creating three versus two overloads in wide areas with the eights and the full backs.

Finally, can the team play to the strengths of the players available. With Maeda there is little point dropping the ball to him back to goal on the touchline under pressure 50 yards from goal other than for a give and go.

How can the team work to their strengths? Keep trying to find Maeda (or Abada) with the type of pass Greg Taylor executed in the second half inside the full back. Encourage Maeda to keep making the runs out to in and behind the defence especially when Kyogo drops off. Get Abada involved closer to goal in concert with the ten.

All easy to say than do. Last season Celtic destroyed packed defences by overloading on numbers and passing the ball quicker.

This season there seems to be an emphasis on hitting quicker longer passes to exploit the forwards’ pace, but this comes at the expense of control on occasions.

Attacking patterns are the hardest to coach but maybe some retrenchment needed in the short term until the squad is comfortable with what is being asked.