Managing Risk on the Postecoglou Rollercoaster

Celtic started the latest transfer window with an array of first team players returned to their host clubs, wanting to leave, running down contracts and potentially not required by a new manager. Eight senior pros left. Ten first team squad members have been purchased since.

Has an enormous level of change provided Postecoglou with the tools he needs to win this year’s title?

A Problem Two Years in The Making

In reality Celtic’s situation has been brewing since the Summer of 2019.

Previously, and for most years, Celtic operated roughly 3-5 major players in and out – a steady churn. That level is regenerative of the squad and moves players on at a sustainable rate.

The sheer volume of moves increased rapidly from that 2019 Summer window (all listed are First Team players):

19/20 Incoming	20/21 Incoming
Jullien Bolingoli Elhamed Taylor Frimpong Klimala Soro Forster (loan) Bauer (loan) Elyounoussi (loan)	Barkas Ajeti Turnbull Elyounoussi (loan) Duffy (loan) Laxalt (loan) Kenny (loan)
19/20 Outgoing	20/21 Outgoing
De Vries Gamboa Allan Izaguirre Boyata Lustig Mulumbu Tierney Compper Sinclair Morgan	Kouassi Hayes Simunovic Gordon Frimpong El Hamed Klimala

The issues introduced with the approach above have been:

1. SQUAD DEPTH ERODED – A general reduction in first team squad numbers – a huge purge in 19/20 was not replaced and then COVID constraints further hindered strengthening
2. RELIANCE ON LOANS – the number of loans arriving has increased from 1-2 a season to 3-4 and the nature of those loans – players relied upon in the first team as opposed to taking a punt on a prospect like Roberts or Musonda
3. FAILURE TO RECRUIT KEY POSITIONS – specifically the reliance on loans to replace Lustig and Tierney at full backs means Celtic have never strategically replaced those key individuals in both full back areas
4. EROSION OF YOUTH PROGRAMME – not shown above, but in parallel to this, and mainly thanks to Scottish footballs failure to provide meaningful competition for non-first team players, 25 youth players or projects have also left further reducing options
5. COST OF FAILURE – the cost of recruiting badly hurts a club for years. In this period, of the 10 first team players brought in permanently, only 4 can be considered successful (Jullien, Taylor, Frimpong and Turnbull). That 40% hit rate is too low and when added to the other factors above, means a weakened, as well as shallow, squad

Additional issues were introduced due to COVID restricting physical movement and depressing the transfer market, allied to a desire to maintain the successful 19/20 squad to aim for 10 in a row:

1. PLAYER DISASTSFACTION – a number of players who wanted to leave for their own development purposes were either persuaded to stay, or, more likely, couldn’t be sold at an acceptable price – Ajer, Christie, Edouard and Ntcham.
2. SQUAD STAGNATION – a number of players who had not impressed could not be sold, to free up wages and generate some additional capital, e.g. Bayo, Shved, Hendry.

Welcome Dominic!

In the meantime, from a point around October 2020 when it was obvious to all that Lennon’s time was up, to 10th June when a new manager was finally appointed, Celtic appeared to do nothing.

Into this mess CEO Dominic McKay eventually walked. With a new manager to find, no Head of Recruitment, no Director of Football and the above extant issues.

Somehow, a line of logic was drawn between candidates Roy Keane and Eddie Howe that resulted in Ange Postecoglou being appointed the next Celtic manager (insert an emoji that conveys astonishment whilst thanking one’s lucky stars).

However they got there, Celtic seemed to have landed lucky.

Here is a man with a plan. Someone who has a very definite idea of how he wants his teams to play and has delivered transformative success in each job he has taken on. And done so in very different environment including international football.

Finding players to fit what is becoming known as “Angeball”, has resulted in an additional ten first team squad players arriving:

1. Abada
2. Furuhashi
3. Starfelt
4. Hart
5. McCarthy
6. Juranovic
7. Scales
8. Giakoumakis
9. Jota (loan)
10. Carter-Vickers (loan)

Meanwhile, another nine first team players have left, 1578 appearances between them:

1. Brown
2. Hendry
3. Bayo
4. Ajer
5. Shved
6. Ntcham
7. Christie
8. Edouard
9. Griffiths (loan to end of contract)

Thus 27 first team players have left since the start of season 19/20.

That level of churn takes a lot of recovering from and is not sustainable.

Change of Approach?

Celtic have at least reduced the dependency on loan signings to some degree. Whereas in the last five seasons there has been 4-5 loan signings for the first team, it is down to 2.

Also, the age profile of the signings has changed upwards. Less 19–22-year-old “projects” and more experienced pros in their early to mid-20s (Abada being the exception).

Thirty-year-olds Hart and McCarthy put on long contracts is also a new departure.

Asset Management

What hasn’t changed is that the asset management aspect is a Celtic strength.

I know transfer business is complex. The transfer fee is paid in tranches; agents and other fees are added; performance clauses are added; transfer value is amortised over the length of the contract and so on. All we have to go on outside the published accounts, is whatever “fee” is published in the public domain.

All those caveats aside and recognising this is a simple guide not an absolute, Celtic have “spent” roughly £19.6m on new players this window whilst “bringing in” roughly £40.3m.

In the current depressed market that is astonishingly good asset management. To achieve the high fees for Ajer and Edouard, and to get £1m plus for the likes of Bayo, Shved and Hendry represents great business.

Replacing a £20m striker like Edouard with Furuhashi for £4.6m is also canny. The purchase of Juranovic for £2.5m could prove astonishing. Abada and Starfelt commended large fees and may take longer to assess.

But given the business Celtic HAVE done, the accountants will be happy (hurrah!) and Celtic have managed to bring in talent that at least has a semblance of coherence to the managers strategy.

Furuhashi, Juranovic, Starfelt, Abada, Jota, Giakoumakis, Carter-Vickers all make sense (to varying degrees) in terms of profile versus the style of football required.

I suspect Hart and McCarthy were “stop the bleeding” signings. That is, the squad lacked a decisive and experienced goalkeeper solid in the basics, and overall lacks numbers in midfield and general experience.

Where Does That Leave Us?

As described, the close to 3-year structural neglect and stresses of a COVID environment, allied to a new manager and philosophy mean a huge rebuild is needed.

Without the recruitment infrastructure in place there was only ever so much McKay and Postecoglou could do on their own.

The squad rebuild is, therefore, partial at best.

Glaring risks remain. Here is how I see those.

Assumptions

In writing this I am using the following assumptions.

These players have been assessed by Postecoglou and are deemed surplus and will not feature unless injuries are so severe he has no choice – Barkas, Bolingoli, Bitton, Ajeti.

The following are not eligible for the B team and have not been sent on loan but are not trusted yet to be in the first team: Shaw, Urhoghide, McInroy.

Goalkeeper

Post window we are in the position of having one goalkeeper who is excellent in the basic “traditional” goalkeeping skill sets and has the experience and personality to match (Hart) but relatively weak in distribution and not comfortable playing more than 20 yards from his goal.

As back up we have a goalkeeper average at best in shop stopping but excellent with his feet and very agile around the park.

This isn’t a trivial comparison as a Postecoglou goaly will attempt 30-45 passes per match but be expected to make 2-5 saves typically. You then gave to factor in the risks AZ Alkmaar exposed by playing long passes into the “corridor of uncertainty” between Hart on the edge of his box and the high defensive line.

For those reasons, this is at least still an Amber risk to me in terms of long term strategic fit of personnel to system.

Risk Rating: Amber

Right Back

I’m not one to make snap judgements (900 minute rule and all that) but I’m prepared to stick my neck out an say Juranovic will prove an absolute steal.

Ralston is back up and can be solid enough as shown.

Risk Rating: Green

Centre Back

With Jullien long term injured, Starfelt is the senior centre back and he is taking time to settle to the style of football and the demands being placed on him as regards passing out from the back. That leaves a new player (Carter-Vickers) whose experience of life is mainly Championship level football, and the ever-improving Welsh.

Beyond that, as reported in The Athletic by Kieran Devlin, Dane Murray and Bosun Lawal, both teenagers, are next inline. It is considered Urhoghide is still too raw to be considered first team ready.

And hopefully the Bitton at centre back fallacy has been put to bed for ever.

Risk Rating: Amber

Left Back

Many in the support have been heartened by the application and sheer willingness to learn that Taylor possesses. Whether that stellar attitude can fully compensate for lack of physicality, pace and technical excellence is a fair question.

Meantime, Scales has been plucked from the League of Ireland and is untested at this level. We are not even sure what his best position might be.

Beyond that Montgomery will fill in.

So Celtic are not short of numbers per se, but adequacy of fit to “Angeball”, and overall ability levels are a worry.

The ghost of Tierney endures.

Risk Rating: Amber

Centre Midfield

From being the strongest area of the team there is are now real risks of a genuine crisis in this key department.

Celtic have a plethora of players who can conceivably play “6” – McGregor, McCarthy, Soro and Connell. But do not have a single player whose primary skill set is as a box to box “8”. Not one. And there are two slots in Postecoglou’s system for such a plyer.

Sure, playing Rogic and Turnbull as “8”s at home to Dundee is absolutely fine. But away to Real Betis or Bayer Leverkusen, or even Hibernian, would be folly.

The only serviceable option against remotely good opposition would see McCarthy, McGregor and Turnbull together. But this is less than ideal as we lose McGregor’s regista stylings at “6”, and Turnbull’s more natural goal threat at “10”.

There isn’t even the depth beyond that. Henderson has never played centre midfield for Celtic being seen in the wide attacking areas. And there is little evidence to suggest McInroy is the long-term answer. And that is it.

The only other option I can see is that Celtic revert to 4-2-3-1 with two holding midfielders, one of which is McGregor (sigh) and one natural “10” in which case Rogic and Turnbull provide options. But there is no evidence that is how Postecoglou wants to play.

It’s a puzzle.

Risk Rating: Red

Right Attack

Whilst Abada has made a very promising start for a 19-year-old, the evidence of the last two matches away to AZ Alkmaar and The Rangers emphasises that against better opposition, he remains a prospect.

Forrest is injured at this moment and Dembele out long term the same.

The only other option in this position remains Henderson.

If all are fit Celtic are well served but at this time this is added to the At Risk category.

Risk Rating: Amber

Left Attack

New recruit Jota has over 5000 minutes in his senior career but only if you count Youth and B team football. It is 863 minutes of senior league football, 407m in Cups and 140m in Europe. He’ll need to adjust to Scottish football as any new, young recruit would.

Johnston’s injury frailties persist and we have no clear return date.

Beyond that coverage is again provided my Montgomery who is promising but raw. Or Furuhashi is moved over further weakening central attacking options.

Risk Rating: Amber

Striker

Giakoumakis and Furuhashi have been brought in and Griffiths essentially exiled to Dundee for the duration of his contract. Edouard has been sold. Ajeti has been given very limited minutes and has not been trusted to come on in the last two defeats.

So that leaves two strikers where one may need to play left attack as described above.

We don’t know how or when Giakoumakis will adapt to Scottish football and Celtic in particular.

Risk Rating: Red

The way to think about risk is: what is the likelihood of the risk materialising, and what is the impact if it does. You then prioritise remediating action accordingly. That remediating action will now have to wait until January. All Amber and Red Risks need attention.

Think of the Amber rated risks having a Medium probability of occurring and the Red ones a High risk of occurring. Not all risks will turn into Issues but a combination of them most certainly will.

Will that be sufficient to derail a title challenge? Who knows, but the main competitor has, despite clear finance needs, maintained their huge squad with an ability to swap like for like in all positions.

Summary

Firstly, this has been a “successful” window in terms of starting to reshape the squad to Postecoglou’s requirements, bringing in some real talent, and being pragmatic in some positions to stop the bleeding.

From an Asset Management perspective, it’s a doozy.

No one sensible thought all Celtic’s squad woes would be solved in one window and I estimate it will take two more.

Glaring and highly uncomfortable risks will need to be navigated between now and January. Add in the fact the style of play is high energy, high pressing and fast movement. Add in the propensity for certain challenges in Scotland to go unpunished. Injury and burn out risk is high probability.

This all adds up to a highly stressed environment.

I am far from comfortable even though I am certain the direction of travel and the start of the journey are on point.

This will be some rollercoaster.