The Celtic Number 10
Tom Rogic has been having the most productive season of his Celtic career, a career lacking linear progression and punctuated by spectacular goals, and injuries. He made the attacking midfield centre (AMC) position his own last season, taking over from Johansen who had been favoured by Deila. Commons has been the most consistently used in that position when either Rogic or Johansen were unavailable.
Rogic’s absence for another 2 months (at least) forces Rodgers to consider the attacking team shape once again. Whilst consistently maintaining an intrinsic 4-2-3-1 shape, there have been variations in Celtics attacking shape throughout the season. For example, in recent matches, Celtic have had to cope without a focal “number 9” at the centre of the attack and instead opted for a “false 9” utilising Roberts.
Rogic is the most natural player to play in the “10” position – that is, the middle of the “3” – charged with linking the 2 deeper midfielders to the 2 wide forwards and the central striker. This AMC position is essential in a 4-2-3-1 as it provides the creativity and glues the forward players together. Since Rogic has been injured, Rodgers has adjusted the shape of the team rather than directly replace the role Rogic was performing. The last two games have seen Henderson given at advanced AMC role, but prior to that Rodgers preferred more of a 4-3-3 shape. This is characterised by three forwards pushed high, two more defensive central midfielders (MC) in Brown and Bitton with one MC given licence to break forward (Armstrong).
Henderson would seem to prefer a deeper role and could be considered a competitor with Armstrong and Bitton for 1 of the 2 MC positions alongside Brown. With Allan out on loan, Commons out the squad and Johansen sold, what do Celtic miss by not having a number 10?
A look back at the last three season shows that many others have played AMC briefly as follows:
Player | Season | Minutes at AMC |
Allan | 15/16 | 175 |
Armstrong | 14/15 | 180 |
Armstrong | 15/16 | 224 |
Armstrong | 16/17 | 311 |
Berget | 14/15 | 26 |
Christie | 15/16 | 101 |
Christie | 16/17 | 126 |
Henderson | 14/15 | 10 |
Henderson | 15/16 | 2 |
Henderson | 16/17 | 138 |
McGregor | 14/15 | 77 |
McGregor | 15/16 | 433 |
McGregor | 16/17 | 106 |
Roberts | 16/17 | 66 |
Stokes | 14/15 | 90 |
Armstrong’s 715 minutes does not make eight full games. None have played AMC enough to have a meaningfully large data sample. Therefore I am discounting those players from this analysis.
Johansen, Commons and Rogic have played AMC as follows over the last 3 seasons:
The three AMCs are all very different players and have therefore brought different strengths and weaknesses to the role.
Creativity
Creating chances for others is one of the primary jobs of the classic Number 10. The player in this position tries to find the spaces between the lines of the defensive shape of the opposition. They seek to bring the wide forwards into play, feed balls through to the striker, and be alert to the deeper midfielders breaking into attacking positions. They are the enganche, the hook.
Player | Assists 90 | Chances Created 90 | Chances Attempted 90 | Chance Success 90 | Pass Complete 90 | Pass Complete % |
Johansen | 0.34 | 1.38 | 2.53 | 55% | 40.22 | 77% |
Commons | 0.21 | 0.6 | 1.71 | 35% | 34.04 | 75% |
Rogic | 0.34 | 0.95 | 1.83 | 52% | 36.79 | 83% |
Stefan Johansen was a very modern type of AMC in that he would press the opposition relentlessly. While not the quickest, he was remorselessly energetic. Not obviously possessing vision and guile, Johansen at AMC nevertheless posted the highest chance creation (1.38 per 90m) of any Celtic player over the last three years. By way of contrast, Roberts leads in 16/17 with 1.14. Sinclair and Forrest are below 1. His Assist90 of 0.34 is the same as Rogic and on a par with Sinclair, Forrest and Roberts this season.
As one might expect from such a busy player, he completed more passes per 90m that either Rogic or Commons. His passing was more accurate than Commons but less so that Rogic. Rogic is by some distance the more accurate passer (83%) and achieves the same assist rate as Johansen with fewer passes and fewer attempts at through balls.
Overall, Johnsen was the most successful at creating chances from AMC (creating a chance with 55% of attempts), and attempted to set up significantly more chances (2.53 per 90m) than the others, which certainly challenges my confirmation bias! (This is a good thing, being one of the objectives of the blog).
Attacking
Although primarily a creator, the AMC can play the role as a deeper forward, and occasional 2nd striker. Playing mainly central, the AMC can be expected to get into shooting positions of some promise or even getting beyond the striker with well-timed runs.
Of the three players who have played AMC at Celtic over the last three seasons, Commons is the best known for goals having scored 91 in 226 appearances. Commons has most often been deployed as a wide support forward or even support striker. We are only looking at his performances as AMC for the purposes of this analysis.
Player | NPGoals 90 | Shot On Target% | Shots Attempted 90 | Dribbles Attempted 90 | Dribble Success % | Dis possessed 90 |
Johansen | 0.26 | 49% | 2.04 | 1.09 | 31% | 3.43 |
Commons | 0.26 | 41% | 4.61 | 1.92 | 38% | 4.10 |
Rogic | 0.49 | 40% | 3.94 | 3.11 | 52% | 5.46 |
When you remove the five penalties Commons scored at AMC and the one Johansen scored, Rogic is the clear prime goal scoring threat, averaging 0.49 non-penalty goals per 90m which is a rate of return most strikers would be proud of. He achieves this despite being the least accurate of the three hitting the target with 40% of shots, and taking less shots than Commons (3.94 per 90m). With Rogic in the team at AMC, a strong case exists to refute the need for a 2nd striker
Johansen’s goal return dropped in 15/16 as he tended to play deeper but he has managed 12 non-penalty goals in the equivalent of 46 games as AMC. Surprisingly his NPGoal90 is the same as Commons, whose scoring rate decreases significantly once you remove the five penalties he managed when playing AMC.
Rogic is also the king of the “take ons” attempting 3.11 dribbles per game and being successful 52% of the times. Commons is not a quick player and tries to beat players with small movements to shift the ball, or a “skill”. He attempted 1.92 per game but was only successful 38% of the time. Johansen tried the least take ons (1.09 per 90m) and was also the least successful (31%).
Unsurprisingly Rogic loses the ball more than the other two, being dispossessed 5.46 times per 90m. To put this in context, in 16/17 only Dembele (5.62 per 90m) is dispossessed more often. Rogic does attempt to take players on where it does not look the best decision and this is an area of his game that can be developed. He is a tall and strong player and although none of the three are blessed with great pace, Rogic has great skill, close control and long legs therefore the dribble should remain part of his armoury!
Rogic is consequently the most fouled of the three (1.66 per 90m) whilst Johansen only drew 1.19 fouls per 90m.
An indicator of technique, as well as concentration, is the number of mis-controls per 90 – that is, the number of occasions the player lost possession failing to control the ball. Commons, who is a player I always thought sometimes “switched off” mentally, loses the ball through mis-control 1.41 times per game. For Johansen, this is 1.00 per 90m but for Rogic it is 0.73 per 90m, nearly half that of Commons. This is not a predictor for robustness of technique but certainly an indicator. Rogic’s control under pressure usually looks safe.
Johansen leads the three in being caught offside, 0.26 time per 90m whilst Rogic is only caught 0.1 times per 90m. Johansen tended to make breaks beyond the striker compared to the others.
Defending
Celtic do not play the (mythical?) trequarista, the player given license to find space in an attacking sense and do little defensively. Under both Deila and Rodgers all players are expected to lead a high press from the front, and to fall back into defensive shape without the ball. Under Deila, all eleven players tended to be withdrawn to defend corners whilst under Rodgers Celtic often leave players up field but this tends to be the smaller, faster wide forwards. The AMC in Celtic’s formation has therefore had to perform defensive duties over the last three seasons.
Player | PEI% | Possession Won 90 | Challenge Won % | Clearances 90 | Defensive Saves 90 | Defensive Errors 90 |
Johansen | 67% | 5.11 | 46% | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.11 |
Commons | 65% | 2.86 | 34% | 0.60 | 0.09 | 0.13 |
Rogic | 71% | 4.92 | 46% | 0.27 | 0.00 | 0.20 |
Overall Rogic is the most effective at maintaining possession, doing so from 71% of all events. Commons again lags the other two retaining possession only 65% of the time. Not surprisingly, Commons is successful with only 34% of challenges, whilst the rangy Rogic and aggressive Johansen win 46% of theirs. Johansen wins 5.11 interceptions and tackles per 90m compared to 4.92 from Rogic. Commons trails well behind at 2.86 – as well as being the slowest of the three, he generally undertakes less defensive actions.
Johansen commits the most fouls (1.92 per 90m), Rogic 1.57 and Commons at 0.6 prefers minimal engagement it would appear! The number of challenges engaged it helps illustrate this. Johansen’s decision making regarding challenges was not always perfect and he picked up a yellow card at the rate of 0.26 per game compared to 0.13 for Commons and 0.1 for Rogic.
Summary
The evolution of the number 10 is engagingly described by expert football historian Jonathan Wilson here in the Guardian. The closing quote from that article is “perhaps the truth is that playmaker is not a position at all but a state of mind”. In the case of Celtic the Number 10 AMC role is not one filled by a dreamy Riquelme clone, all deft flicks, aesthetic through balls and sweat less brow. Celtic have filled the role with an all action but highly creative presser (Johansen), a goal scoring deep forward (Commons) whose scoring effectiveness appears diminished in this role, and Tom Rogic, a player whose natural position this appears to be. No others in the squad have been tried there to any lasting degree although Henderson, having started the last two games, may stake a claim. Otherwise, it seems that Rodgers must adapt the shape of the attacking formation until such time as Rogic returns. 11 goals in the last two games suggest no blunting of the attack without Rogic, but with him in the team the needs for a “second” striker appears less pressing.
We have not yet mentioned fitness and Rogic has completed 90m only 13 times over 63 appearances as Celtic AMC. With another injury removing him from selection, Johansen sold and Commons out of favour, if Rodgers wants to have the AMC role filled, Celtic are exposed in terms of lack of cover. With Armstrong excelling as a more orthodox MC, will Henderson take his chance?
Player Radars (AMC Position Only)
Johansen attacking
Johansen Defending
Commons Attacking
Commons Defending
Rogic Attacking
Rogic Defending
SFTB says
We currently have 4 game changers who penetrate tight defences to create chances for themselves or others. These are Rogic, Sinclair, Forrest and Roberts. They are the guys you give the ball to, after you have tired of passing it around in front of the packed defence, and you tell them- “make it happen!”
If we ever have 3 of these 4 unavailable at the same time, I think we could struggle.
SK93 says
Excellent article – and really interesting that Rogic wins posession almost as much as Johansen did despite being perceived to be less energetic (perhaps he is just more efficient with it?)
Will be interesting to see if BR puts him straight back into the team once fit.
I think one factor that you can’t quantify but that is quite visibly apparent is that Rogic seems to make the entire team play better – general movement and attacking always seems more fluid/promising when he’s on the pitch.
celticbynumbers@btinternet.com says
Interesting point. I could look at whether the team creates more chances with Rogic in the team. Not direct causation but an indicator of your hypotheses. Leave it with me.